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ABSTRACT 
Voter Involvement, Fiscal Autonomy and Public Sector Efficiency: 
Evidence from German Municipalities    
by Benny Geys, Friedrich Heinemann and Alexander Kalb * 
Social and/or political involvement within the population is often argued to 
enhance public sector performance. The underlying idea is that engagement 
fosters political awareness and interest and increases the public’s monitoring 
ability. Still, weak fiscal autonomy can undermine voters’ interest in and demand 
for an efficient production of public services. In our contribution, we test whether 
and how voter involvement in the political sphere is related to government 
performance – in terms of its efficiency – using a broad panel of German 
municipalities. Our results suggest that voter involvement indeed has a positive 
impact on cost efficiency. Crucially, however, this efficiency-enhancing effect of 
voter involvement is significantly positively affected by local governments’ fiscal 
autonomy. 
 
Keywords: Civic engagement, fiscal autonomy, local government, efficiency, stochastic 
frontier analysis, German municipalities 
JEL Classification: H11, H40 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Wähler-Beteiligung, Finanzhoheit und Effizienz des öffentlichen Sektors: 
Aussagen von deutschen Kommunen 
Häufig wird argumentiert, dass eine soziale und politische Beteiligung der 
Bevölkerung die Effizienz des öffentlichen Sektors fördert. Die grundlegende 
Idee ist, dass dieses Engagement politisches Bewusstsein und Interesse fördert 
und somit die Möglichkeiten der Öffentlichkeit zur Kontrolle erhöht. Allerdings 
untergräbt eine schwache Finanzhoheit das Interesse der Wähler und ihre 
Nachfrage nach einer effizienten Produktion öffentlicher Leistungen. In unserem 
Beitrag testen wir anhand eines breiten Panels deutscher Kommunen, ob und 
wie die Beteiligung von Wählern in der politischen Sphäre im Zusammenhang 
zum Leistungsverhalten einer Regierung – im Hinblick auf Effizienz – steht. 
Unsere Ergebnisse deuten darauf, dass sich die Beteiligung der Wähler 
tatsächlich positiv auf die Kosteneffizienz auswirkt. Entscheidend ist jedoch, 
dass dieser Effizienzfördernde Effekt der Wählerbeteiligung signifikant positiv 
von der Finanzautonomie der kommunalen Regierungen beeinflusst wird. 
                                                 
*  We thank Daniel Becker, Lars-Erik Borge, Lars Feld, Eckhard Janeba, Per Tovmo and two 
anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions. Support by the German Research 
Foundation (DFG) within its Priority Programme 1142 “Institutionelle Gestaltung föderaler Systeme” 
is gratefully acknowledged.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
Engagement in social life has been argued not only to increase interest in and understanding 
of politics, but also to make one more willing and effective in demanding ‘good’ government 
(e.g., Boix and Posner, 1998). As such, voter involvement may well help tame the Leviathan. 
Clearly, however, two crucial assumptions have to be met for this argument to hold. Firstly, 
civic engagement should foster political awareness and interest. Scheufele et al. (2004), 
among others, provide some evidence that this is indeed the case. Secondly, this increased 
interest and involvement in the political sphere should improve government performance. The 
validity of this second ‘assumption’, however, has received little attention and was recently 
described as a “plausible, important but insufficiently tested proposition” (Toka, 2008, p. 31).  
 
The present paper takes a first step to bridge this gap. It empirically assesses whether voters’ 
political involvement improves government performance – and, crucially, whether fiscal 
autonomy of the local government is a prerequisite for such an effect to establish itself (see 
below). We thereby define good government performance as higher efficiency of public 
service provision (or, phrased more negatively, as a reduction in budgetary slack or rent-
seeking).1 The efficiency measure employed is based on the public sector as a whole, rather 
than on a given area of public good provision: e.g., waste collection, administration, road 
maintenance, and so on (e.g., Kalseth and Rattsø, 1998; De Borger and Kerstens, 2000). This 
‘global’ approach is appropriate when “the explanatory variables characterize the local 
government institution rather than being sector-specific” (Borge et al., 2008, p. 476) – as is 
here the case. In such a setting, concentrating on “one particular element of service provision 
may be inadequate (or even misleading)” (Ashworth et al., 2007, p. 12). 
 
While numerous studies examine local government efficiency and its determinants (e.g., De 
Borger et al., 1994; De Borger and Kerstens, 1996; Worthington, 2000; Geys, 2006; 
Balaguer-Coll et al., 2007; Bruns and Himmler, 2008; Geys and Moesen, 2009a, b), only one 
of these includes a measure of political involvement (i.e., Borge et al., 2008). The latter study 
illustrates that the public’s democratic participation tends to improve efficiency – in line with 
theoretical predictions – even after controlling for numerous political, fiscal and budgetary 
                                                 
1  Economic efficiency is obviously only one among many public concerns (besides effectiveness, equity, 
responsiveness, adequateness, appropriateness, and so on; Dunn, 2004, p. 223-231) and our focus on it should 
not be taken to mean that it is more important than the remaining issues. Yet, efficiency has received 
increasing amounts of attention in recent years (e.g., in the New Public Management (NPM) discussions since 
the late 1980s; Lindblad, 2006) and our study intends to add to recent attempts at understanding factors that 
affect or influence it (see below). 
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variables. The present study intends to add to our understanding of the participation-efficiency 
nexus by diverging from and/or extending upon Borge et al. (2008) in four main ways.  
? First, and purely methodologically, we exploit a stochastic frontier approach to measure 
efficiency (cf. Aigner et al., 1977; Meeusen and van den Broeck, 1977), whereas Borge et 
al. (2008) rely on the ratio between aggregate output and local government revenue. Our 
approach, although itself imperfect (see below), has the benefit of allowing a distinction 
between measurement error and inefficiency. 
? Second, our empirical analysis is based on a broad panel of German municipalities (rather 
than Norwegian municipalities; cf. Borge et al., 2008). As a result, we have a larger 
dataset at our disposal including across-time variation in crucial variables. Moreover, it 
implies that we analyse the participation-efficiency nexus in a different political and 
institutional setting – making our results interesting also from a comparative perspective.  
? Third, we assess a broad set of indicators of voter involvement – thus going beyond 
electoral turnout as a measure of citizen involvement (as in Borge et al., 2008). As such, 
we are able to examine how different ways through which voters can get politically 
involved affect government performance.  
? Finally, and most importantly, we are – to the best of our knowledge – the first to assess 
how the participation-efficiency nexus is affected by the degree of local fiscal autonomy. 
Building on the fiscal illusion literature, fiscal autonomy (in contrast to dependence on 
external grants) may be seen as a crucial intervening variable since it implies that voters 
are effectively confronted with the tax bill for their desires. As a result, we argue that an 
active citizenry is more likely to value the careful use of public money when it originates 
mainly from own revenue sources rather than external transfers. 
 
The remainder of the article is structured in four main parts. The first of these presents the 
theoretical background and our main hypotheses. Section 3 then introduces the German 
institutional and political setting. The empirical analysis is provided in section 4. We show 
that voter involvement is indeed linked to increased government cost efficiency and that, in 
line with theoretical predictions, this effect is stronger in communities with higher fiscal 
autonomy. Finally, section 5 reiterates the main findings and discusses some implications.  
 
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses 
From a theoretical perspective, the link between voter involvement and the efficiency of 
public policy can be analysed in a standard principal-agent setting (cf. Migué and Bélanger, 
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1974; Niskanen, 1975; Borge et al., 2008). Local government officials act as agents for the 
population, who – as principals – desire the government to provide as many public goods as 
possible for a given fiscal cost. That is, “voters want more competent politicians in office, as 
they can provide more public goods for given levels of taxation and private consumption” 
(Alt and Lassen, 2006, p. 1404; see also Shi and Svensson, 2006). However, there is a clear 
conflict of interest in that politicians (or bureaucrats) in charge of public goods provision may 
benefit from less productive activities: e.g., higher salaries, lower effort, over-employment 
within their service, and so on. Given that politicians (or bureaucrats) tend to be better 
informed about the true cost of providing public goods than the general population, there 
exists an incentive to invest in such less-productive activities. These, however, induce 
budgetary slack (or inefficiency).  
 
Importantly, the extent of budgetary slack is likely to be affected by the formal as well as 
informal institutional setting. One crucial element in this respect is whether or not the 
principal assumes an active role in informing himself about and supervising the actions of his 
agent. Specifically, agency theory assumes that principals can resolve part of their imperfect 
information of the agent’s work effort through stricter monitoring (Alchian and Demsetz, 
1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Holmström, 1979; Laffont and Tirole, 1986). This reduces 
information asymmetries between principal and agent, thereby limiting possibilities for 
wasteful spending and rent extraction by the agent. In other words, the ‘information rent’ 
extracted by the agent is likely to become considerably smaller with monitoring such that 
budgetary slack is reduced when the principal is actively involved (e.g., Moene, 1986; Chan 
and Mestelman, 1988).2
 
Our empirical analysis below concentrates on political involvement of voters as one means to 
actively monitor politicians (see also Strumpf, 1998; Borge et al., 2008) and thereby improve 
policy outcomes. The reason for this focus is that participating citizens have been argued to be 
more critical, better informed and more vigorous in demanding particular policies (Boix and 
Posner, 1998; Scheufele et al., 2004). A more active citizenry therefore increases supervision 
of and pressure on government officials and, following the predictions from agency theory, 
                                                 
2  Recent experimental evidence is generally supportive of a disciplining effect of monitoring (e.g., Nagin et 
al., 2002; Dickinson and Villeval, 2008). Still, in personal interactions, this disciplining effect may be 
counterbalanced by a crowding-out effect because supervision diminishes the intrinsic motivation of the 
agent (see Frey, 1993a, b; Barkema, 1995). As the principal-agent relation in our setting is impersonal (i.e. 
voter-government), we assume dominance of the disciplining effect of monitoring. 
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increases their effort levels. To the extent that higher effort enhances performance, a first 
hypothesis can thus be stated as follows: 
 
HYP 1: Higher voter involvement increases local government performance 
(i.e. efficiency) 
 
Clearly, Hypothesis 1 rests on the assumption that voters desire efficiency in the provision of 
local public goods. This, however, is not necessarily always the case. In fact, the extensive 
literature on fiscal illusion argues that when government revenues employed to finance public 
goods provision are at least in part unobserved by voters, the latter might have an inaccurate 
perception of the true cost of public goods provision. This, in turn, affects the behaviour of 
politicians. One consequence of fiscal illusion is the so-called “flypaper effect” (Heyndels and 
Smolders, 1994; Hines and Thaler, 1995; Heyndels, 2001) which entails that revenues that a 
jurisdiction obtains from lump-sum grants are used differently than revenues from own tax 
sources. In fact, while economic theory would suggest that an increase in revenues from both 
sources is equivalent and has similar implications on the jurisdiction’s spending pattern 
(Bradford and Oates, 1971), unconditional grants are de facto more likely to be used for 
additional spending rather than tax cuts (for a review, see Mueller, 2003, p. 221-223). 
 
Another potential consequence of fiscal illusion is that voters may end up caring about 
government (in)efficiency only when they are directly confronted with the tax bill for public 
goods provision. When there is an imperfect mapping of citizens who consume and finance 
public services (or, in other words, when fiscal institutions are not built on the principle of 
‘fiscal equivalence’; Olson, 1969), voters’ function as efficiency guards may be impaired 
because other people’s money is being wasted. Voters then are likely to put less weight on the 
careful use of public money (since it, at least in part, originates from external transfers). This 
line of argument suggests that in transfer-dependent municipalities with low fiscal autonomy, 
high voter involvement need not be associated with higher efficiency. Fiscal autonomy (in 
contrast to dependence on external grants) can therefore be seen as a crucial intervening 
variable in the involvement-efficiency relation.3 This leads to our second hypothesis: 
 
                                                 
3  In similar vein, fiscal decentralisation has been argued to increase government efficiency by giving “voters 
increased electoral control over incumbents” (Barankay and Lockwood, 2007, p. 1198). The reason is that 
decentralisation strengthens the negative relation between rent extraction and the probability of re-election 
(e.g., Seabright, 1996; Persson and Tabellini, 2000; Hindriks and Lockwood, 2005). 
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HYP 2: The effect of voter involvement on local government performance 
(i.e. efficiency) is mediated by the degree of local fiscal autonomy 
 
3. German local political and fiscal setting 
Baden-Württemberg lies in the southwest of Germany (bordering France and Switzerland) 
and is the third largest of the 16 German federal states – both in terms of surface area and 
number of inhabitants. Its 10.7 million inhabitants are currently distributed among 1109 
municipalities which currently range in size from about 100 to almost 600.000 inhabitants. 
Each of these municipalities is governed by a local council (elected on five-year terms) and a 
directly elected mayor (with an eight-year term). The mayor acts as the chairman of the 
municipal council and has significant agenda-setting powers. Both council and mayor have 
their own statutory responsibilities, which are the same across all municipalities. 
 
At the state level, Baden-Württemberg is a traditional stronghold of the Christian Democrats 
(CDU). Since the state’s inception in 1952, the state government has generally been led by 
CDU prime ministers, often as one-party governments (the sole exception is the 1952-53 
government under liberal prime-minister Reinhold Maier). At the municipal level, the CDU 
has been almost equally dominant (see table 1). Still, unlike state or federal elections, local 
elections in Baden-Württemberg are also characterized by the increasing importance of so-
called “free voter unions” (Freie Wählervereinigungen). The latter can be seen as an indicator 
of local voter involvement. The reason is that they are a grassroots type of organization that is 
the result of local initiatives. They are not linked to the traditional political ideologies and 
even explicitly reject the idea of constituting a political party. Also, no national organization 
of free voters exists that initiates the foundation of free voter unions at the local level. While 
in some cases they do form networks at the state level, these local groups are independent 
(and tend to focus on specific affairs within their municipality).4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4  “Free voter unions” can also be seen as a response to bad polities of the past. But even then, these initiatives 
can be regarded as an indicator of higher voter involvement since dissatisfied citizens now actively participate 
in politics and get involved in the political process in order to change something. We return to this issue later. 
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Table 1: Results of local council elections in Baden-Württemberg (% of valid votes) 
 Election year 
 1975 1980 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 
CDU (Christian Democrats) 38.9 39.6 37.9 32.6 31.6 36 33.2 
SPD (Social Democrats) 29.2 30.2 26.3 25.6 24.1 21.7 19.9 
FDP/DVP (Liberals) 5.5 5.3 3.9 4.6 3.5 3 3.7 
GRÜNE (Greens) 0 1.7 6.3 5.9 7.7 5.2 8.2 
Wählervereinigungen 
(Voters' unions) 19.9 18.3 21.6 23.6 26.6 27.5 29.4 
Other 6.5 4.9 4 7.7 6.5 6.6 5.6 
Source: Statistical Office Baden-Württemberg 
 
One other institutional characteristic of the Baden-Württemberg municipalities that is of 
importance for our purpose concerns their degree of fiscal autonomy. German municipalities 
in general have some – albeit limited – leeway in generating own revenues. To see this, a brief 
look at their revenue structure is required. Most basically, revenues derive from three main 
sources: tax revenue (on average 41% of total municipal revenues in 2004), allocation of 
funds (through, for example, fiscal equalization schemes) (31%) and user charges (9%) (see 
figure 1(1)).5 Among the tax revenues, however, a substantial part (i.e. 42%) originates from 
shared taxes (i.e. income tax and VAT) decided upon by the federal and state-level 
governments. Local governments can only independently decide on five types of taxes 
(although the federal government even here often sets a regulatory ‘framework’): trade tax 
(Gewerbesteuer), property tax (Grundsteuer), tax on keeping dogs, second residence tax and 
entertainment tax. Only the first two of these yield significant revenues (41% and 15% of total 
tax revenues in 2004 respectively, see figure 1(2)).6 Overall, revenues from fiscal equalization 
schemes and shared taxes (over which the municipalities have no control) constitute about 
half of the municipal revenues and thereby far outweigh revenues from autonomously 
determined tax sources. Hence, though some leeway exists in generating own revenues, the 
extensive tax sharing and fiscal equalization payments limit local governments’ budgetary 
autonomy and responsibility. 
 
 
                                                 
5  Note that the numbers do not fully sum to 100%. Other minor sources of revenue include administrative 
revenue, shares in profits, concession levy, support for debt service and sales revenues. 
6  Nevertheless, the most important autonomous tax source – the trade tax – is not paid by voters in general, 
but only by larger local firms (smaller firms are tax-exempt due to tax thresholds). 
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Figure 1: Structure of the total revenue (1) and composition of tax revenue (2) for all
 municipalities in Baden-Württemberg in 2004 
(1)
9%
19%
31%
41%
taxes allocation of funds
other sources of revenue user charges
(2)
4% 2%
41%
38%
15%
trade tax ("Gewerbesteuer") share of income tax
property tax ("Grundsteuer") share of value added tax
other taxes
 
Source: Ministry of Finance of Baden-Württemberg (2006) 
 
Still, and importantly, the degree of fiscal autonomy varies across municipalities in Baden-
Württemberg. We more specifically distinguish between two types of municipalities based on 
their requirement to receive ‘key grants’ (Schlüsselzuweisungen) under the horizontal (i.e. 
inter-municipal) fiscal equalization scheme. This horizontal element of the fiscal equalization 
scheme tries to balance communities’ economic prowess by comparing the fiscal capacity of 
each municipality with its fiscal needs:7 If fiscal capacity exceeds fiscal needs, the jurisdiction 
obtains no key grants; in case fiscal capacity lies below fiscal needs the municipality receives 
‘key grants’ according to a predetermined formula. Obviously, awarding such ‘key grants’ to 
a municipality increases its grant-dependence and reduces its fiscal autonomy. This allows us 
to distinguish between ‘independent’ municipalities that obtain no ‘key grants’ and 
‘dependent’ municipalities that do receive such grants.8 In 2004 ‘independent’ municipalities 
made up approximately 9.4% of all communities. 
 
                                                 
7  Fiscal capacity (Finanzkraft) is calculated out of the municipalities’ sum of the different tax revenues and      
the key grants received two years ago, whereas fiscal needs (Finanzbedarf) are established by the product of 
a predetermined per capita sum (Kopfbetrag) and the number of inhabitants of each municipality. 
8  It should be noted that the classification of a municipality as ‘independent’ and ‘dependent’ can change due 
to parameter changes of the fiscal equalization scheme. If, for example, the predetermined per capita sum 
(Kopfbetrag) is increased, some of the ‘independent’ municipalities can get ‘dependent’. On the other hand, 
an increase in the state-wide uniform collections rates (Anrechnungshebesätze) (which are used to determine 
the fiscal capacity of a municipality) would make some of the ‘dependent’ municipalities ‘independent’. The 
choice of ‘independent’ and ‘dependent’ municipalities as indicators for the degree of fiscal autonomy is 
therefore rather a relative than an absolute concept.  
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Finally, to get an impression of the main tasks of the municipalities and how much they spend 
on these tasks, table 2 provides an overview of municipal spending on selected areas of public 
good provision for the year 2004 (in per capita values as well as a percentage of total current 
expenditure). The table reveals that approximately one third of the money is spent on general 
financial management (like interest and amortization repayments). In contrast, expenditures 
on social security, public facilities and business development as well as general administration 
account for roughly 10 to 13% of the budget. Other posts on the budget are somewhat smaller. 
Architecture, housing and traffic as well as schools account for roughly 7% of the budget, 
while the last four posts on the budget absorb approximately 3 to 5% of the budget.    
 
Table 2: Current expenditures of the municipalities per capita and as a percentage of total 
current expenditures for selected areas of public good provision in 2004  
Scope of functions Expenditure (in € per capita) 
Share of total current 
expenditure (in %) 
General Financial Management 702.01 35.08 
Social Security 269.32 13.46 
Public Facilities, Business Development 225.56 11.27 
General Administration 182.32 9.11 
Architecture, Housing, Traffic 155.16 7.75 
Schools 123.54 6.17 
Health, Sport, Recovery 101.86 5.09 
Commercial Companies, General Basic and 
Separate Assets 93.70 4.68 
Science, Research, Culture 81.29 4.06 
Public Safety 66.66 3.33 
Sum 2001.42 100 
Source: Statistical office of Baden-Württemberg and own calculations 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1. Model specification 
Our analytical strategy is to identify the impact of voter involvement on municipalities’ 
overall cost efficiency. For that purpose, we build on the stochastic, parametric approach to 
efficiency measurement developed by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck 
(1977). Most generally, and using a translogarithmic specification (cf. Christensen et al., 
1973), the empirical model can be written as (with i and t subscripts for decision-making units 
and time respectively): 
          , , , , , , ,1 1 1
1ln ln ln ln
2
s s s
i t r r i t rq r i t q i t i t i tr r q
C y y yα β λ= = == + + + +∑ ∑ ∑ , ,v u  (1) 
where C designates the input indicator (which in effect can be interpreted as the money 
equivalent of multiple inputs), y indicates the various output indicators, s points to the number 
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of outputs incorporated in the model and βr and λrq are parameters to be estimated.9 The 
advantage of such a parametric approach is that it allows distinguishing measurement error 
from inefficiency. This is achieved through a composed error term consisting of a symmetric 
component (v) (assumed white noise) and a one-sided non-negative component ( ) 
representing inefficiency. These error components are assumed to be independent. Note that 
while equation (1) takes the same form as a stochastic frontier production function (as 
employed in, e.g., Grossman et al., 1999 and Barankay and Lockwood, 2007), we essentially 
estimate a cost function. As such, we relate one input (i.e. costs) to various outputs, rather 
than one output (e.g., education attainment) to various inputs. This approach follows, for 
example, De Borger and Kerstens (1996), Athanassopoulus and Triantis (1998), Tanaka 
(2006) and Geys and Moesen (2009a, b). 
0≥u
 
Importantly, the influence of exogenous or non-discretionary influences that might shape 
local government performance can be introduced into the model above. This is important 
since certain characteristics of a municipality – such as the extent to which voters are involved 
in the political process – may affect how efficiently the local government is in carrying out its 
tasks (Battese and Coelli, 1995; Stevens, 2004). To accommodate such elements, we assume 
that the inefficiency term (u) in equation (1) is a function of a set of community 
characteristics (cf. Battese and Coelli, 1995). In other words, and as discussed in Coelli (1996, 
p. 7), u is “assumed to be independently distributed as truncations at zero of the N(mi, ) 
distribution where m
2
uσ
i = δ zi”. In this extension, zi is a vector of background variables which 
are expected to influence (in)efficiency and δ  is a vector of parameters to be estimated. Or: 
                                         , ,1
J
i t j j i t i tj
u zγ δ== + +, ,w∑ , (2) 
where i is the subscript for decision-making units (local governments) and t the time 
subscript. The error term of equation (2), w, is defined by the truncation of the normal 
distribution with zero mean and variance  (Battese and Coelli, 1995). The latter 
assumption assures that the inefficiency component u can only take values bigger than or 
equal to zero.
2σ
10  
                                                 
9  This is a more general functional form than the traditional Cobb-Douglas function. Specifically, in a Cobb-
Douglas specification, all squared values and cross-product terms are excluded. Statistical tests (not 
reported) indicated that the coefficients λ rq are jointly significantly different from 0 (and, therefore, that the 
translogarithmic functional form is to be preferred to a Cobb-Douglas specification). 
10  Note that we do not include fixed effects in the estimation system for two reasons. First, time series 
variation in some of our explanatory variables is limited, such that fixed effects estimates will be imprecise. 
Secondly, the fixed effects estimator for frontier models recently developed by Greene (2005) produces 
inconsistent parameter estimates with small T (in our case T=3). Moreover, it is subject to significant small 
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 Before turning to the presentation of the input, output and background variables employed 
below, it should be mentioned that heterogeneity of factor costs across jurisdictions might 
complicate our analysis. Fortunately, in our setting, factor price divergence is limited since 
labour and capital costs are largely identical for the municipalities of Baden-Württemberg. 
Interest rate homogeneity exists because all municipalities have access to the same capital 
market in the same currency and the German constitution implies a full bail-out guarantee for 
all public entities (leading to the absence of risk premium differences across German 
jurisdictions). Broadly similar wages are guaranteed via a uniform collective labour 
agreement for the state’s public sector. 
4.2. Data and explanatory variables 
The definition and measurement of public sector outputs is notoriously difficult and fraught 
with data availability problems (cf. Levitt and Joyce, 1987; De Borger and Kerstens, 1996). 
Hence, in line with previous analyses of local government efficiency, we are forced to rely on 
proxies. To allow for maximum comparability, we thereby follow previous work in this field 
to determine which input and output variables to include in the analysis (e.g., Vanden Eeckaut 
et al., 1993; De Borger et al., 1994; De Borger and Kerstens, 1996; Geys and Moesen, 2009a, 
b). We thereby rely on data for 987 municipalities in the German state Baden-Württemberg 
for the 3 years 1998, 2002 and 2004 (data availability precluded the use of the remaining 124 
municipalities).  
 
Our prime input variable (C) is total municipal net current primary expenditures. These 
include all spending on the current budget minus the difference between debt service and 
income from interest. We do not include capital spending as this mainly refers to investment 
spending, which depends on when such projects are agreed upon (and thus tends to inflate 
spending in the years such projects occur).11
 
Local public good provision (i.e. our outputs y) is measured through six variables tapping into 
various important responsibilities of the German local governments with respect to social 
                                                                                                                                                        
sample bias and would not allow us to assess the effects of our exogenous variables in the way explained 
above. 
11  Alternatively, we re-estimated the model using expenditures only for the six output factors defined below. 
This mitigates the possible concern that expenses that fall outside our six output indicators are interpreted as 
inefficiency, and lead to biased inferences. Our main findings are largely unaffected by this alternative 
specification, emphasizing the robustness of our estimation results (see table A2 of the Appendix). We are 
grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out to us. 
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needs, education, recreation and infrastructure: (a) the number of students in local public 
schools (Grund- and Hauptschulen), (b) the number of kindergarten places,12 (c) the surface of 
public recreational facilities, (d) the total population, (e) the population over age 65, and (f) 
the number of employees paying social security contributions. As mentioned, some of these 
measures should be considered as, at best, rather crude proxies for the level of public goods 
provision (see also De Borger et al., 1994; De Borger and Kerstens, 1996). Population, for 
example, proxies the extent of administrative tasks (such as issuing various types of 
documents) whereas the number of elderly indicates service provision to the elderly (e.g., 
retirement homes). Neither, however, is a direct output variable. Therefore, as in previous 
work on local government efficiency, “the outputs used are rather loosely related to the 
services delivered by municipal governments” (De Borger and Kerstens, 1996, p. 153-154). 
 
The crucial part of the model refers to the background variables we introduce in the vector zi,t. 
These are of two kinds: namely, measures for voter involvement and ‘other’ controls. To start 
with the former – as they intend to test our core hypotheses – we introduce three measures 
indicating the extent of voters’ political involvement in the municipality. These capture 
various means through which voters are able to voice their concerns to politicians, and may 
affect efficiency in differing ways.  
? The first measure of political involvement is voter turnout, defined as the number of votes 
cast relative to the number of eligible voters of the municipality. Voter turnout is strongly 
positively related to people’s interest in and knowledge of politics (e.g., Squire et al., 
1987; Brady et al., 1995). As such, high turnout indicates a politically interested electorate 
that has the ability (in terms of knowledge and interest) and desire (given that it actively 
turns out to vote) to supervise and hold accountable its politicians.  
? The second measure of voter involvement is an indicator variable for the existence of free 
voter unions. As argued in section 3, the existence of free voter unions indicates that at 
least some citizens are ready to incur the cost of organization to resolve local policy 
issues. Since free voter unions cannot rely on support from a state- or country-wide party 
apparatus, personnel and financial resources, their members must feel sufficiently 
politically involved to create such an organization. The direction of their effect on 
efficiency is, however, a priori uncertain. On the one hand, their presence could benefit 
                                                 
12  Data about kindergarten places was only available for the years 1998 and 2002. We therefore took the data 
of 2002 to approximate the kindergarten places of the year 2004. Also, we only observe the total number of 
public and private kindergarten places. While it would clearly be preferred to use only the number of public 
kindergarten places, such data were not available. Still, public kindergarten places make up a large fraction 
of total kindergarten places (43% and 44% in 1998 and 2002 respectively). 
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municipal efficiency given the oft-cited beneficial role of associations for socio-political 
and economic outcomes (Putnam 1993; Stolle and Rochon, 1998; Paxton, 2002; Coffé and 
Geys, 2007, 2008; Geys and Murdoch, 2008). On the other hand, the economic literature 
on special interest groups suggests the reverse effect since accommodation of special 
interest groups might also lead to less efficient policies (e.g., Mueller and Murrell, 1986). 
? Our third and final measure of voter involvement is the share of eligible voters to total 
population. This captures the extent to which inhabitants of a given municipality are able 
to control their politicians through the ballot box (not the extent to which they actually do, 
which is captured by the voter turnout measure above). When a substantial share of 
taxpayers has no voting rights (e.g., because they are of non-EU nationality), popular 
intervention through the electoral process is likely to be reduced. 
 
To assess how the degree of fiscal autonomy affects the involvement-efficiency nexus (cf. 
Hypothesis 2), we interact each of the above measures with a dummy variable for 
‘independent’ communities (see section 3). Since these municipalities exhibit the highest 
degree of fiscal autonomy – making the tax price for local expenditures more visible – we 
expect the effect of voter involvement to be stronger in these municipalities. The reason, as 
mentioned, is that citizens are likely to put more weight on the careful use of public money 
which originates from own revenue sources than from external transfers (cf. the literature on 
fiscal illusion). Hence, a more active citizenry is more likely to be a force for efficiency in 
fiscally more ‘independent’ municipalities. 
 
The second set of background variables included in the vector zi,t concerns various elements 
describing the municipality’s socio-economic and political constraints. The former is 
accounted for through population density (measured as inhabitants per are) and the 
unemployment rate. While the former picks up the rural/urban divide (Stevens, 2005) and the 
heterogeneity of property prices (which might affect the cost situation of municipalities), 
unemployment implies higher spending on social benefits (a ‘cost effect’) as well as lower 
demand for high-cost or high-quality public services (a ‘preference effect’).13 The political 
constraints are captured through a Herfindahl index measuring political concentration in the 
local council (higher concentration of power is expected to reduce efficiency; see also 
                                                 
13  Additional factors can be conceived here – such as the geographical location or territorial characteristics – 
but lack of data makes inclusion of such factors difficult. 
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Ashworth et al., 2007)14 and the seat share of left-wing parties (i.e. SPD, Grüne). For the latter 
variable there are two interpretations. First, given that the Christian Democrats have a 
dominating position in Baden-Württemberg (see section 3), the share of the left-wing parties 
can be seen as an indicator of political competition. Second, however, it measures the impact 
of ideology. This ideological effect is not easy to determine a priori. While left-wing parties 
are often assumed to have a preference for a larger government size, this need not imply less 
efficient governments. Descriptive statistics for all variables are given in table 3 below. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics (987 municipalities over 3 years: 1998, 2002 and 2004) 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Input variable:     
Net current primary expenditures  
(in million euros) 
20.40 86.30 0.35 2890.00 
Output variables:     
Students in public schools 662.14 1308.41 0 27126 
Kindergarten places 417.85 825.17 0 17554 
Recovery area (in are) 2480.27 5901.94 0 110841 
Total population 10525.13 26837.23 242 589231 
Population older than 65 1747.26 4625.50 31 105289 
Number of social insured employees  
(at place of work) 
3769.91 14788.02 10 355536 
Voter involvement variables:     
Voter turnout (in %) 63.219 8.337 37.216 88.736 
Free voter unions 0.957 0.203 0 1 
Ratio of eligible voters to total population 
(in %) 
73.122 3.307 60.978 99.753 
Other control variables:     
Unemployment rate (in %) 6.574 1.321 2.900 12.700 
Population density (inhabitants per hectare) 3.358 3.328 0.207 28.416 
Herfindahl index 0.515 0.247 0.211 1 
Share of left-wing parties (SPD+GRÜNE) 
(in %) 
17.838 14.680 0 65 
‘Independent’ municipalities 0.082 0.275 0 1 
Source: Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg 
4.3. Results 
The results – obtained by using FRONTIER 4.1 (Coelli, 1996) – are summarized in Table 4. 
The first three columns provide the results using our three different indicators of voter 
involvement separately. Column 4 includes all three involvement measures at the same time 
                                                 
14  Technically, the Herfindahl index is measured as the sum of the squared seat shares of the main national 
parties (CDU, FDP, SPD, GRÜNE) and local parties. 
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to check the robustness of the individual findings and assess how the relation between all 
three measures affects their respective findings. In the last three columns, we assess the 
mediating effect of fiscal autonomy by including interaction effects between voter 
involvement and fiscal autonomy. Before discussing our findings, it should be noted that the 
variance parameter gamma is close to one in all specifications and highly significant (see 
bottom row of table 4). This indicates that the majority of the variation in the composed error 
term is due to the inefficiency component, ui,t (see section 4.1). Moreover, one-sided 
generalized likelihood ratio tests of the inefficiency effects indicate that in all specifications 
the null hypothesis that the inefficiency effects are absent from the model(s) can be strongly 
rejected. This implies that all covariates of the inefficiency model (given in equation (3) 
above) are jointly significant. Hence, the stochastic frontier model we chose seems to be an 
adequate representation of the data. 
 
To start the discussion of our findings with the control variables, we first of all observe a 
robust negative effect of unemployment. This suggests that the preference-effect (i.e. relating 
to lower demand for high-quality public services among the unemployed) outweighs the cost-
effect (i.e. higher spending on unemployment and housing benefits). Secondly, densely 
populated municipalities appear to have significant cost advantages from agglomeration 
economies. Thirdly, a low degree of political competition – as indicated by a high Herfindahl 
index or, given the dominant position of the CDU in Baden-Württemberg, a low share of left-
wing parties – is associated with lower efficiency (see also Ashworth et al., 2007, for a similar 
finding in a different setting).15 Finally, the positive effect found for financially ‘independent’ 
municipalities suggests that these can afford more (or qualitatively higher) public goods and 
services due to their higher economic power. 
 
 
 
15  While this might indicate that electoral competition promotes efficiency (see section 4), an alternative 
argument might be that political stability leads to higher quality of public services. We are grateful to an 
anonymous referee for pointing this out to us. 
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        Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Production environment and political constraints 
Unemployment Rate -0.0247** 
(-3.5136) 
-0.0514** 
(-6.7206) 
-0.0439** 
(-5.7417) 
-0.0365** 
(-4.5828) 
-0.0235** 
(-2.5856) 
-0.0490** 
(-6.8962) 
-0.0410** 
(-4.3281) 
Population density -0.0555** 
(-6.3933) 
-0.0464** 
(-7.4453) 
-0.0485** 
(-7.4488) 
-0.0409** 
(-5.9351) 
-0.0529** 
(-5.8337) 
-0.0468** 
(-7.6972) 
-0.0447** 
(-5.9409) 
Herfindahl index 0.3453** 
(5.0724) 
0.1254** 
(2.4019) 
0.1264** 
(2.6597) 
0.0036 
(0.0779) 
0.3317** 
(3.8551) 
0.1607** 
(2.6988) 
0.1343** 
(2.0125) 
Share of left -0.0025** 
(-2.4930) 
-0.0090** 
(-4.9833) 
-0.0015 
(-1.4163) 
-0.0058** 
(-4.4367) 
-0.0015 
(-1.2759) 
-0.0090** 
(-4.0450) 
-0.0005 
(-0.4546) 
Dummy independent municipality 
(IM) 
2.5062** 
(6.1182) 
2.2549** 
(6.0632) 
1.7430** 
(7.6678) 
1.6732** 
(6.4256) 
2.7270** 
(5.3425) 
3.3852** 
(5.9887) 
1.1467** 
(1.9620) 
Voter involvement 
Voter turnout (VT) -0.0124** 
(-4.6643) -    -
-0.0045** 
(-2.4775) 
-0.0056** 
(-2.4660) - -
Dummy free voter union (FVU) - -0.6658** (-6.5112) - 
-0.5210** 
(-6.1659) - 
0.1469** 
(2.3723) - 
Ratio eligible voters/population 
(Ratio EV/POP) -    -
-0.0631** 
(-8.0803) 
-0.6020** 
(-6.4779) - -
-0.0608** 
(-5.3781) 
IM * VT -      - - - -0.0079** (-2.0309) - -
IM * FVU -     - - - - -1.2045** (-5.7661) - 
IM * Ratio EV/POP  -      - - - - - 0.0078 (0.8322) 
Sigma-squared 0.2976** 0.2689** 
(6.5733) (6.5343) 
0.2113** 
(8.2073) 
0.1976** 
(6.8306) 
0.2499** 
(6.5530) 
0.2693** 
(6.1351) 
0.1984** 
(7.7788) 
Gamma  0.9559**
(140.2274) 
0.9518** 
(139.0069) 
0.9392** 
(131.9161) 
0.9334** 
(96.7381) 
0.9470** 
(119.0643) 
0.9517** 
(116.1515) 
0.9349** 
(103.7188) 
log-likelihood        1393.22 1394.94 1399.64 1403.48 1391.88 1397.87 1399.75
Table 4: Determinants of Baden-Württemberg’s local government cost efficiency 
 Note: N=2961. Dependent variable: net current primary expenditures. ** (*) denotes significance at the 5% (10%) level. Coefficients of the output indicators  
(and their quadratic and cross product terms) as well as the constant terms of the frontier and the inefficiency model are not reported for space reasons (see Appendix).  
Note also that the estimation accounts for both technical change in the stochastic cost frontier and time-varying inefficiency effects. 
 
Turning now to the central voter involvement variables, table 4 shows that all three indicators 
of voter involvement add significantly to the explanatory power of the model – both 
independently (cf. columns (1) through (3)) and jointly (cf. column (4)). Hence, a first 
conclusion clearly is that voter involvement matters for local government (in)efficiency. A 
closer look reveals, moreover, that all three measures of voter involvement have a positive 
impact on cost efficiency. This provides support for hypothesis 1. Interestingly, the size of the 
coefficient estimates indicates that a one standard deviation change in voter involvement has 
the largest effect on efficiency in the case of free voter unions and the smallest effect in case 
of voter turnout. This relative size of the effects makes intuitive sense. Indeed, establishing a 
free voter union is a very active way of involvement compared to the simple act of voting, 
which is often seen as the easiest and least costly – both in terms of money, time and other 
resources – way of participating in politics (see Milbrath, 1965; Verba and Nie, 1972).16 As 
such, it can be expected to have less far-reaching consequences in the conduct of political 
decision-making.17
 
Finally, columns (5) to (7) provide significant support for hypothesis 2. That is, the 
interactions between the dummy variable for fiscally autonomous (i.e. ‘independent’) 
municipalities and voter turnout (IM*VT) as well as its interaction with the presence of free 
voter unions (IM*FVU) show highly significant negative coefficients. The coefficient of the 
third interaction variable (IM*RatioEV/POP) is unexpectedly positive but remains 
insignificant. These findings strongly suggest that in municipalities with a higher degree of 
fiscal autonomy, the positive effect of voter involvement on municipal cost efficiency is more 
powerful. This is most strongly the case in column (6). There we actually observe that the 
positive effect of free voter unions on municipal efficiency is driven by those municipalities 
that are fiscally autonomous. In municipalities that are strongly dependent on external funds, 
the effect of voter involvement is positive (and statistically significant). One explanation for 
this result, as suggested above, is that an active citizenry is likely to put more weight on the 
                                                 
16  It should be noted that reverse causality may be an issue. Indeed, since inefficiency might lead to the 
creation of free voter unions or stimulate people to turn out to vote (see above), the coefficient of the free 
voter unions (FVU) and voter turnout (VT) variables may suffer from endogeneity bias. Nevertheless, to the 
extent that this reversed channel of causation exists, the FVU and VT coefficients in column (2) are biased 
upwards and our results provide an under-estimate of the true effect. 
17  Two other reasons might explain the stronger impact of free voter unions. First, they can be interpreted as a 
highly independent political actor in political negotiations and monitoring activities (which, given the 
positive effect on efficiency, does not appear to work as a narrowly defined interest group with very specific 
efficiency-deterring demands). Second, the presence of free voter unions might intensify political 
competition since it implies a non-ideological player entering the political stage. As also discussed above, 
political monopolies are prone to administrative slack and inefficiencies in public service production. Free 
voter unions can be seen as undermining such political monopolies. 
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careful (i.e. cost-efficient) use of public money when these public funds originate from own 
revenue sources rather than external transfers.  
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we investigate the relation between voter involvement and local jurisdictions’ 
cost efficiency. While higher social and political involvement within the population is often 
argued to be beneficial for the performance of the public sector, it remains unclear from a 
theoretical point of view whether higher voter involvement necessarily results in a higher or 
lower performance of (local) governments. One reason is that voters may only care about the 
careful use of public money when it originates from own (tax) revenue sources rather than 
external transfers. As a consequence, high voter involvement is more likely to result in better 
(or more efficient) performance only in municipalities with a high – rather than low – degree 
of fiscal autonomy.  
 
Our empirical analysis – using a broad panel of 987 German municipalities for the years 
1998, 2002 and 2004 – illustrates that higher voter involvement is on the whole associated 
with higher rather than lower levels of cost efficiency. This conclusion is in line with previous 
findings by Borge et al. (2008) for Norwegian municipalities – despite the differences in 
institutional setting, methodological approach and measurement of government efficiency 
between their study and ours. Compared to their results, however, our analysis allows for two 
more detailed conclusions. First, we find that this positive relation between voter involvement 
and government efficiency is supported also for measures of involvement other than voter 
turnout: i.e. the presence of free voter unions in the local council, and the ratio of eligible 
voters to total population. Interestingly, the effect is found to be weakest for voter turnout. 
Second, and crucially, our results reveal that this positive relation between voter involvement 
and government efficiency is not automatic. Rather, it is stronger when the degree of fiscal 
autonomy of the municipality is higher. As a consequence, stimulating civic engagement in 
politics is especially desirable when the institutional setting is such that the fiscal burden of 
public policies falls on those voting for these policies (i.e. a high degree of fiscal equivalence; 
cf. Olson, 1969).  
 
In future research, it would be of interest to replicate the current study using data from 
specific government outputs. Although we do not necessarily believe that the relation we 
observe for the local government sector as a whole must necessarily also be present for each 
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and every government output independently, it would certainly be interesting to analyse for 
which government sectors the relation uncovered in our analysis holds and for which it does 
not.  Such a cross-policy approach would also allow assessing what drives these differences 
and for which policy areas voter involvement and fiscal autonomy are critical. 
 
While proper caution is due when drawing policy implications from our analysis (given that 
we are forced to rely on proxies for voter involvement), our results clearly provide some food 
for thought. At first sight, they suggest that one should try to encourage citizens to be more 
active in the political process (e.g., via casting a ballot). Indeed, higher levels of voter 
involvement on the whole increase government performance. This is, however, not an easy 
route to take. Voter involvement in Baden-Württemberg (as elsewhere) is de facto decreasing. 
For example, in the period considered here voter turnout in local council elections fell from 
approximately 67% in 1994 to 52% in 2004. A more detailed reading of our results, however, 
shows that this is not the only way to increase local government performance. Indeed, an 
alternative route is to increase the degree of local governments’ fiscal (or revenue) autonomy. 
Our results suggest that the effect of voter involvement is stronger in fiscally more 
autonomous (and therefore less dependent on external transfers) municipalities. Even though 
actual involvement declines (see above), higher budgetary slack can then still be avoided by 
making municipalities depend to a stronger degree on own funding. In such a setting, an 
active citizenry will put more weight on the careful use of public money. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Complete results of the multi-output frontier estimation 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Stochastic frontier 
Constant 13.0831** 
(17.3273) 
13.0077** 
(17.3178) 
13.1690** 
(17.5426) 
13.2472** 
(17.6644) 
12.9712** 
(17.0529) 
12.9762** 
(17.2719) 
12.9268** 
(17.0307) 
A: Students in public 
school 
0.1297 
(1.4091) 
0.1261 
(1.3491) 
0.1447 
(1.5744) 
0.1556* 
(1.6834) 
0.1272 
(1.3744) 
0.1285 
(1.3627) 
0.1469 
(1.6144) 
B: Kindergarten places 0.5836* 
(2.1895) 
0.6137* 
(2.3180) 
0.6094* 
(2.2803) 
0.5807* 
(2.2498) 
0.5630* 
(2.1181) 
0.5836* 
(2.2088) 
0.5527* 
(2.1213) 
C: Recovery area 0.4265** 
(3.7748) 
0.4189** 
(3.7472) 
0.4110** 
(3.6441) 
0.4097** 
(3.6851) 
0.4358** 
(3.9515) 
0.4241** 
(3.7747) 
0.4275** 
(3.9533) 
D: Total population -2.1708** 
(-3.8502) 
-2.1479** 
(-3.8262) 
-2.2452** 
(-3.9976) 
-2.3001** 
(-4.0987) 
-2.0837** 
(-3.6670) 
-2.1281** 
(-3.7923) 
-1.9993** 
(-3.4750) 
E: Population older than 
65 
0.4689 
(1.0869) 
0.4569 
(1.0722) 
0.4981 
(1.1627) 
0.5565 
(1.3154) 
0.4123 
(0.9731) 
0.4533 
(1.0619) 
0.2912 
(0.6793) 
F: Number of social 
insured employees 
0.7946** 
(5.1448) 
0.7794** 
(5.0693) 
0.8180** 
(5.3491) 
0.8230** 
(5.3313) 
0.7812** 
(5.1547) 
0.7842** 
(5.0996) 
0.8121** 
(5.4090) 
A2 -0.0053 
(-1.3451) 
-0.0055 
(-1.4093) 
-0.0045 
(-1.1445) 
-0.0042 
(-1.0776) 
-0.0051 
(-1.3191) 
-0.0055 
(-1.3951) 
-0.0042 
(-1.1150) 
B2 0.0243** 
(2.5927) 
0.0256* 
(2.4510) 
0.0250** 
(2.6013) 
0.0250** 
(2.7472) 
0.0239* 
(2.4644) 
0.0242* 
(2.4970) 
0.0246* 
(2.5470) 
C2 0.0022 
(0.5882) 
0.0026 
(0.7302) 
0.0027 
(0.7046) 
0.0029 
(0.7739) 
0.0021 
(0.6026) 
0.0025 
(0.7076) 
0.0024 
(0.6746) 
D2 0.3614** 
(3.0547) 
0.3618** 
(3.0646) 
0.3764** 
(3.1935) 
0.3879** 
(3.2825) 
0.3441** 
(2.9090) 
0.3569** 
(3.0275) 
0.3222** 
(2.6795) 
E2 -0.0439 
(-0.5818) 
-0.0354 
(-0.4743) 
-0.0406 
(-0.5415) 
-0.0280 
(-0.3721) 
-0.0463 
(-0.6374) 
-0.0373 
(-0.5017) 
-0.0666 
(-0.9188) 
F2 0.0480** 
(5.2278) 
0.0485** 
(5.2535) 
0.0485** 
(5.2462) 
0.0472** 
(5.2196) 
0.0481** 
(5.3775) 
0.0494** 
(5.3744) 
0.0490** 
(5.4751) 
F * E 0.0520 
(1.3939) 
0.0486 
(1.3297) 
0.0633* 
(1.7040) 
0.0651* 
(1.7959) 
0.0478 
(1.3037) 
0.0475 
(1.2870) 
0.0588 
(1.6052) 
F * D -0.3014** 
(-5.2010) 
-0.2977** 
(-5.1877) 
-0.3102** 
(-5.4021) 
-0.3109** 
(-5.3834) 
-0.2966** 
(-5.2233) 
-0.2977** 
(-5.1659) 
-0.3061** 
(-5.4184) 
F * C 0.171* 
(1.9666) 
0.0161* 
(1.8674) 
0.0156* 
(1.8026) 
0.0157* 
(1.8185) 
0.0170* 
(2.0280) 
0.0168* 
(1.9568) 
0.0163* 
(1.9388) 
F * B 0.1326** 
(4.2382) 
0.1346** 
(4.2850) 
0.1298** 
(4.1563) 
0.1301** 
(4.1632) 
0.1332** 
(4.3391) 
0.1321** 
(4.1842) 
0.1283** 
(4.1667) 
F * A 0.0105 
(1.1284) 
0.0098 
(1.0370) 
0.0089 
(0.9661) 
0.0096 
(1.0206) 
0.0098 
(1.0839) 
0.0099 
(1.0365) 
0.0091 
(1.0098) 
E * D 0.0452 
(0.2438) 
0.0388 
(0.2109) 
0.0271 
(0.1471) 
0.0018 
(0.0098) 
0.0649 
(0.3597) 
0.0437 
(0.2381) 
0.1084 
(0.5960) 
E * C 0.0921** 
(3.1953) 
0.0890** 
(3.1064) 
0.0893** 
(3.0789) 
0.0863** 
(3.0808) 
0.0941** 
(3.3635) 
0.0897** 
(3.1277) 
0.0925** 
(3.3370) 
E * B -0.2060* 
(-2.3771) 
-0.2069* 
(-2.3975) 
-0.1940* 
(-2.2362) 
-0.1983* 
(-2.2633) 
-0.2165* 
(-2.5143) 
-0.2082* 
(-2.4103) 
-0.2199* 
(-2.5469) 
E * A -0.0088 
(-0.3407) 
-0.0100 
(-0.3837) 
-0.0133 
(-0.5206) 
-0.0093 
(-0.3576) 
-0.0101 
(-0.3885) 
-0.0097 
(-0.3651) 
-0.0128 
(-0.4970) 
D * C -0.1310** 
(-3.0948) 
-0.1279** 
(-3.0644) 
-0.1265** 
(-2.9988) 
-0.1243** 
(-3.0309) 
-0.1345** 
(-3.2680) 
-0.1297** 
(-3.0891) 
-0.1322** 
(-3.2643) 
D * B -0.0538 
(-0.5971) 
-0.0600 
(-0.6694) 
-0.0635 
(-0.7037) 
-0.0566 
(-0.6304) 
-0.0433 
(-0.4764) 
-0.0517 
(-0.5761) 
-0.0359 
(-0.3971) 
D * A -0.0441 
(-1.2612) 
-0.0417 
(-1.1776) 
-0.0421 
(-1.2199) 
-0.0461 
(-1.3327) 
-0.0418 
(-1.1822) 
-0.0426 
(-1.1886) 
-0.0422 
(-1.2166) 
C * B -0.0202 
(-0.9299) 
-0.0197 
(-0.9095) 
-0.0205 
(-0.9382) 
-0.0201 
(-0.9309) 
-0.0189 
(-0.8788) 
-0.0198 
(-0.9018) 
-0.0184 
(-0.8572) 
C * A 0.0092 
(1.5046) 
0.0088 
(1.4362) 
0.0093 
(1.5172) 
0.0087 
(1.4835) 
0.0094 
(1.6267) 
0.0092 
(1.4981) 
0.0090 
(1.5559) 
B * A 0.0400* 
(1.6878) 
0.0394 
(1.6348) 
0.0388* 
(1.6513) 
0.0376* 
(1.6641) 
0.0383 
(1.6187) 
0.0397 
(1.6374) 
0.0377 
(1.6169) 
Year1 0.0339** 
(8.3878) 
0.0344** 
(8.7181) 
0.0332** 
(7.4540) 
0.0324** 
(7.4079) 
0.0352** 
(7.5768) 
0.0357** 
(8.7792) 
0.0328** 
(6.7549) 
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Table A1 (continued): Complete results of the multi-output frontier estimation 
Inefficiency model 
Constant -1.6025** 
(-4.1933) 
-1.1508** 
(-3.3095) 
3.1445** 
(9.4701) 
4.0774** 
(7.5925) 
-1.6503** 
(-3.7218) 
-1.9804** 
(-3.8106) 
2.9785** 
(5.3281) 
Unemployment rate -0.0247** 
(-3.5136) 
-0.0514** 
(-6.7206) 
-0.0439** 
(-5.7417) 
-0.0365** 
(-4.5828) 
-0.0235** 
(-2.5856) 
-0.0490** 
(-6.8962) 
-0.0410** 
(-4.3281) 
Population density -0.0555** 
(-6.3933) 
-0.0464** 
(-7.4453) 
-0.0485** 
(-7.4488) 
-0.0409** 
(-5.9351) 
-0.0529** 
(-5.8337) 
-0.0468** 
(-7.6972) 
-0.0447** 
(-5.9409) 
Herfindahl index 0.3453** 
(5.0724) 
0.1254* 
(2.4019) 
0.1264** 
(2.6597) 
0.0036 
(0.0779) 
0.3317** 
(3.8551) 
0.1607** 
(2.6988) 
0.1343* 
(2.0125) 
Share of left -0.0025* 
(-2.4930) 
-0.0090** 
(-4.9833) 
-0.0015 
(-1.4163) 
-0.0058** 
(-4.4367) 
-0.0015 
(-1.2759) 
-0.0090** 
(-4.0450) 
-0.0005 
(-0.4546) 
Dummy independent 
municipality (IM) 
2.5062** 
(6.1182) 
2.2549** 
(6.0632) 
1.7430** 
(7.6678) 
1.6732** 
(6.4256) 
2.7270** 
(5.3425) 
3.3852** 
(5.9887) 
1.1467* 
(1.9620) 
Voter turnout (VT) -0.0124** 
(-4.6643) - - 
-0.0045* 
(-2.4775) 
-0.0056* 
(-2.4660) - - 
Dummy free voter union 
(FVU) - 
-0.6658** 
(-6.5112) - 
-0.5210** 
(-6.1659) - 
0.1469* 
(2.3723) - 
Ratio eligible voters 
(EV) / population (POP) - - 
-0.0631** 
(-8.0803) 
-0.6020** 
(-6.4779) - - 
-0.0608** 
(-5.3781) 
IM * VT - - - - -0.0079* (-2.0309) - - 
IM * FVU - - - - - -1.2045** (-5.7661) - 
IM * RatioEV/POP - - - - - - 0.0078 (0.8322) 
Year2 -0.1326** 
(-5.2779) 
-0.0945** 
(-5.8795) 
-0.0131 
(-0.9589) 
-0.0411* 
(-2.4968) 
-0.1359** 
(-4.5517) 
-0.0949** 
(-6.1454) 
-0.0101 
(-0.5494) 
Sigma-squared 0.2976** 
(6.5733) 
0.2689** 
(6.5343) 
0.2113** 
(8.2073) 
0.1976** 
(6.8306) 
0.2499** 
(6.5530) 
0.2693** 
(6.1351) 
0.1984** 
(7.7788) 
Gamma 0.9559** 
(140.2274) 
0.9518** 
(139.0069) 
0.9392** 
(131.9161) 
0.9334** 
(96.7381) 
0.9470** 
(119.0643) 
0.9517** 
(116.1515) 
0.9349** 
(103.7188) 
log-likelihood 1393.22 1394.94 1399.64 1403.48 1391.88 1397.87 1399.75 
Note: N=2961. Dependent variable: net current primary expenditures. The dependent as well as the output variables are in 
natural logs. ** (*) denotes significance at the 5% (10%) level. The variables “year1” and “year2” accounts for both technical 
change in the stochastic cost frontier and time-varying inefficiency effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2: Sensitivity analysis: The determinants with an alternative definition of the municipalities’ expenditure 
Variable        (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Production environment and political constraints 
Unemployment Rate -0.0245** 
(-3.6669) 
-0.2449** 
(-3.1444) 
-0.1473** 
(-5.3444) 
-0.0272** 
(-3.9264) 
-0.0362** 
(-4.6356) 
-0.2249** 
(-3.1408) 
-0.2208** 
(-3.6254) 
Population density 0.0010 
(1.3341) 
0.0098* 
(1.6863) 
0.0033 
(0.7970) 
0.0008 
(0.3824) 
0.0033 
(1.1387) 
0.0115** 
(2.2251) 
0.0074* 
(1.8273) 
Herfindahl index 0.0882** 
(2.4189) 
0.7770** 
(3.4419) 
0.5060** 
(5.7243) 
0.1101** 
(2.5103) 
0.1206** 
(2.6476) 
0.6613** 
(3.0193) 
0.7347** 
(3.2288) 
Share of left 0.0010** 
(4.9282) 
0.0003 
(0.2293) 
0.0019* 
(1.7175) 
0.0014* 
(1.8311) 
0.0002 
(0.2313) 
0.0001 
(0.0893) 
0.0009 
(0.9103) 
Dummy independent municipality 
(IM) 
0.0753** 
(4.7770) 
0.4933** 
(3.4264) 
0.3087** 
(6.6730) 
0.0849** 
(4.5565) 
0.1533 
(0.8899) 
1.3621** 
(3.4727) 
6.3988** 
(2.2542) 
Voter involvement 
Voter turnout (VT) -0.0035** 
(-3.7717) -    -
-0.0042** 
(-2.8652) 
-0.0046** 
(-2.5355) - -
Dummy free voter union (FVU) - -0.2463** (-2.0133) - 
0.0025 
(0.0717) - 
0.1512** 
(2.3611) - 
Ratio eligible voters/population 
(Ratio EV/POP) -    -
-0.0067** 
(-2.1565) 
-0.0032 
(-1.4963) - -
0.0130** 
(2.2831) 
IM * VT -      - - - -0.0004 (-0.1486) - -
IM * FVU -     - - - - -1.0142** (-3.4911) - 
IM * Ratio EV/POP  -      - - - - - -0.0826** (-2.1667) 
Sigma-squared 0.0312** 0.1491** 
(205.4895) (3.3643) 
0.0973** 
(6.5987) 
0.0309** 
(27.9620) 
0.0369** 
(11.0568) 
0.1296** 
(3.3156) 
0.1427** 
(3.1744) 
Gamma  0.0096
(0.0919) 
0.8371** 
(16.0853) 
0.7518** 
(18.8513) 
0.0167 
(0.5868) 
0.2771** 
(3.2544) 
0.8127** 
(14.0780) 
0.8318** 
(14.7760) 
log-likelihood        949.44 946.84 946.21 951.27 948.58 950.10 949.24
Note: N=2961. Dependent variable: Total expenditures for the output factors defined in section 4.2: (1) Total population includes the expenditures on general administration, (2) number  
of students includes the expenditures on schools, (3) number of kindergarten places and (4) population over age 65 include parts of the expenditures on social security, (5) surface of public 
recreational facilities includes the expenditures on recovery, and (6) number of employees paying social security contributions includes the expenditures on business development. For the 
shares of the different expenditure categories see table 2. ** (*) denotes significance at the 5% (10%) level. 
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